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Ferenc Miszlivetz
Security and the Status Quo
Global militarisation and its fetishisation as a
naturally given phenomenon, follow from the present
structure of world-wide inequality. The entrenchment
of military and paramilitary institutions and the
monopolisation of information through the mass
media reproduce and increase subordination,
exploitation and oppression between and within
societie. The existing international status quo is
nothing but a legal petrification of this situation. In
theory it represents the interest of every nation-state,
based on the idea that each state possesses equal
rights. In reality the concept of security has been
extended over and imposed on weaker states by their
stronger fellows. 'If states are equal', they seem to be
saying to their smaller allies or would-be allies, 'you
have the choice to be protected by me, so my security
will be your security'.
In the course of struggle for world hegemony, in
which, in fact, only very few states have real chances,
the question of maintaining the status quo is of crucial
importance. Even if I cannot win at this very moment,
I cannot concede acquired positions or lose my allies.
From this point of view the concept of security
subsumes the concept of power struggle.
Although in the era of nuclear technology this rivalry
creates dangers for the superpowers themselves, their
strategists and statesmen still cling to the theoretical
possibility of some kind of victory. The irrational and
anti-human nature of this hope is often pointed out.
Yet it has never been entirely abandoned. Every power
struggle, every effort to annihilate or paralyse the
'enemy' eo ipso involves this moment of irrationality.
In this epoch of incredibly efficient technology,
mankind is unable to exercise this irrationality or to
curb it with a truly democratic control - either on a
global level or through the nation-state.
The official ideologies which have successfully
transplanted the concept of security into public
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opinion, are worth closer investigation. However
obvious their contradictions, their efficiency is
undeniable. The ideology of state socialism on one
side, and of democracy and freedom on the other; the
ideology of bureaucratic nationalism which inter-
penetrates with both of them; the ideology of national
security, which is based upon bureaucratic nationalism;
and the ideology of bloc-identity which combines
bureaucratic nationalism with belief in world power
hegemony - all these share a common element. They
treat the squandering of scarce resources, the
uncontrollable arms race, military institutions and the
growing probability of a total nuclear confrontation
as a natural and unquestioned feature of the world
political scene.
It is almost as if the leaders of the military industrial
complexes and military alliances have borrowed a
lesson from Orwell and Marcuse. Except among a thin
stratum of critical opinion, the anti-war propaganda
of the war-preparing states causes apathy and
indifference. Peace slogans are followed up by self-
confident parades of forces or by direct and indirect
intimidation. So the concepts of war and peace are not
only closely related to each other, but they merge into
one dimension within which the threat of war from the
one side legitimises armament of the other -
justifying the created image of danger and hence the
stabilisation of internal order, in other words, the
oppression of any dissent. Thus the social movements
which give expression to economic or political
tensions are portrayed as the 'agents' or 'vanguard' of
the enemy and public opinion grows more and more
apathetic.
The New International Military Order
and Global Anarchy
In the literature on the arms race and the New Cold
War, more and more discussion can be found of their
connection with the inner structure of the increasingly
militaristic state and that of civil society subordinated
to it. As a consequence efforts have been made to
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reconceptualise well-used political and political-
scientific concepts. In his essay on the new military
order, for example, Jan Oberg argues that the war
machine tends to penetrate ever more deeply into
contemporary social formations [Oberg 1980]. The
new International Military Order has been generated
by the core industrial states and above all by the
superpowers, bringing into existence global strategies,
alliance systems, military infrastructures, the militari-
sation of space, etc. Even if they no longer fight wars
amongst each other, the core-states shape global
militarisation by creating and maintaining conflict-
centres in underdeveloped societies into which they
introduce the highly advanced technology derived
from their arms production. This kind of 'develop-
ment' combines both military and civil interests; and
therefore there has emerged, he argues, an isomorphism
between the civil and the military sphere of society:
'Ismorphism suggests a fundamental, continuous
correspondence between the two "spheres" of society.
In principle, the notion applies both to the national
and the international level of analysis' [Oberg 1980:
54].
Another way of putting it is that an isomorphism
exists between modes of production and modes of
destruction. This idea, the theoretical roots of which
can be found in the late 19th century and early 20th
century Marxist literature - for example in the
writings of Engels, Liebknecht, Luxemburg and
Bukharin - has been further developed by Mary
Kaldor with some criticism:
In the rare instances where Marxists have written
about the mode of warfare, they have tended to
assume that modes of warfare 'reflect' modes of
production . . . The point is not that modes of
warfare 'reflect' modes of production but rather
that warfare can only be produced on the basis of a
given mode of production. The mode of warfare
can never exactly reflect the mode of production
because .of its essentially parasitical nature, and
because war as a form of commensuration differs
from all other forms of commensuration [Kaldor
1982: 268-9].
The militarisation of civil society is a historical
process, within which the emergence of total war
proved to be a decisive step. This step became possible
- and even necessary - on the base of technological
development. This deepening gap between highly
advanced technology and the failure to use it for
democratic social purposes has created a deep
civilisational crisis [see Miszlivetz and Kaldor 1985:
56-61]. The latter had already begun to manifest itself
as early as World War I. As Abrahamsson [1972: 23]
has put it: '. . . the invention of the aeroplane and,
later, the ballistic missile created a new concept total
warfare. Total warfare brought total defence; this, in
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turn, meant closer integration between the military
and civilian sectors'.
But this integration is increasingly asymmetric, with
the military-industrial sector tending to become the
'centre' while the civilian sector becomes
peripheralised. Oberg [1980: 64] points out the
interdependent nature of this process:
as long as the civilian society is willing to pay for
its own subordination, i.e. as long as it is politically
accepted that the military sphere exploits ever
larger civil resources in order to deliver a product
called security, while civil society is rapidly losing
every kind of inner strength and non-military
defence capacity.
Hence this isomorphism involves the destruction of
democratic values. The war machine and the military
industrial complex have become organic in the
economies and social formations of industrialised
countries to such a degree that demilitarisation would
(if not carefully managed) lead to the breakdown of
political and social life.
This asymmetric integration of the military order
within the boundaries of the nation-state also fosters
subordination and insecurity on a global level. The
efforts of the major powers to establish international
security in the interstate system, only result in more
anarchy and violence. Modifying Marx's phrase on
capitalist development, according to which 'the road
to Hell is paved with good intentions' we can say: the
road leading to extermination is paved with
disarmament negotiations.
One 'logical' resolution of this situation would be if
one of the superpowers could establish a monopoly of
military force on a global level, as has already
happened on the 'national' and 'bloc' levels. But so
far, all efforts to establish a lasting and exclusive world
hegemony have failed. No state or military alliance has
won a permanent and absolute victory in a 20th
century war. Thus the end of each war has become the
starting point for new power struggles.
Another more likely outcome of the present situation
is the conservation of existing political, economic and
cultural tensions in the form of more than one world
empire - a new step towards the world of 1984. The
bipolar cold war logic seems to strengthen this
possibility. Tacit mutual agreement amongst the
world powers stipulates that none of them will use
nuclear weapons. Meanwhile wars are fought by
'conventional' means in 'peripheral' territories,
keeping alive the need for 'security', 'order' and
'discipline' and the whole complex value system of
civil subordination.
Following Robin Luckham (1984) the present global
scene can be described as an international anarchy, the
final form of which is nuclear war. Luckham's analysis
concludes that insecurity and irrationally are built into
the premises of the arms race themselves. According to
official ideologies, weapons systems defend the
existing social and economic structures, together with
the international division of labour which supports
them. Yet the fact is that the question of how much
force is needed for this 'defence' is entirely
unanswerable. One may add that armament is
motivated not only by the defence of the status quo,
but also by struggles for world hegemony. Naturally,
these struggles bear closely upon the international
division of labour, upon the problem of resources and
upon economic development/underdevelopment, and
cannot be understood in isolation.
We have also to take into account other more
neglected aspects of this anarchy, whose nature is less
'material'. One of these is the subordination of the
institutions of international law and arbitration to the
logic of bipolarity. Indeed, the monopoly of organised
force may even be stronger at an international than at
a 'national' level. At the same time, oversecured state
boundaries mean that there is very little room for the
internationalisation of democratic public opinion.
To summarise, the backwardness and provincialisation
of the nation-state as a form of political organisation,
relative to highly advanced and internationalised
technology, help to explain the growing irrationalism
of the arms race. In 1930 Walter Benjamin had already
pointed out that 'every new war will be a slave revolt of
technology' [Benjamin 1930]. Our problem is that this
irrationalism presents itself in an apparently rational
form. Even after two world wars and the nuclear arms
race it is still capable of justifying itself according to
Clausewitz's maxim that 'war is the continuation of
politics but with different means'. I am not the first
person to have argued that nuclear war is not the
continuation but the end of politics.
This is only another aspect of the socioeconomic
process we have described above: the subordination of
modes of production by modes of destruction. To be
more accurate: production in general is increasingly
becoming the reproduction - on an increasing scale
- of the means of destruction, manipulation and
deterrence. The arms race threatens civil society with
total occupation through its promiscuous network of
military interests and the alliances organised around
them.
Militarisation in the South
The concept of a new military order, however, does
not mean that the process of global militarisation has
evolved in the same form in all nation-states, or that
we could speak of a homogenous militarism. A
military monoculture exists only to the extent that
military intervention and transfers of military
technology by the centre-states of the North directly
and indirectly structure militarisation in the periphery,
creating new chains of dependence. Noam Chomsky
in a recent essay emphasises the decisive role of
superpowers in generating global militarisation:
Today, more than ever, a growing volume of
military strategy and technology is designed by the
superpowers not for war against each other, but for
war against the weak, the defenceless people in
underdeveloped countries who cannot strike back.
This involves among other things helicopters,
napalm, rapid deployment forces, and tactical
nuclear weapons. These are not designed for wars
against powerful nations.
In the post-war period, when the Third World
countries started to struggle for their political
independence, they had to confront this highly
advanced technology. Under these circumstances
there seemed little choice. They had to accept military
aid and absorb modern weapon systems if they wanted
to improve their position in the hierarchy of the
interstate system. Thus their arms imports and
military spending remained on a steady upward trend,
which did not level off until the developing countries
were hit by recession in the early 1980s.
However, it is impossible to understand the process of
militarisation without also taking into account the
'inner' conditions of Third World societies. In the
same way as the problems of underdevelopment are
not merely economic, the process of militarisation,
taking place under the circumstances of under-
development, necessarily includes political, ideological,
cultural and socio-psychological elements. The danger
lies in the possibility that militarisation - often
launched with promises of 'development' and
'modernisation' - may become an organising force
which will leave its mark on the process of
development for ever.
This is all the more likely since Third World societies,
though heterogenous, share certain common structural
features. One of these is the lack of autonomous or
democratic institutions or even the chance to establish
them. Civil society is even weaker, and the practice of
direct military repression is more familiar than in the
countries of the industrialised North. Armies in the
Third World thus tend to resemble superpolice,
organised to combat inner not external 'enemies'.
Hence one faces a specific intertwining of moderni-
sation and militarisation: the more underdeveloped an
economic social formation, the more brutal and
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militaristic the process of modernisation tends to be;
and the greater the contradiction between imported,
highly advanced military technologies and the general
state of society and economy. The build-up of military
and paramilitary forces strengthens the already strong
apparatuses of official violence, widening the political
role played by the military, extracting more and more
from the otherwise scarce resources of poor countries.
What we get here is a peculiar contribution by the
North to the 'rise of the South'. Imported means of
destruction represent the most advanced output of
industrial civilisation. These technical miracles
contrast sharply with the material culture, techno-
logical level, and the adaptive ability of the societies
and economies of the South. Even if imported military
technologies and the infrastructures required for them
can sometimes contribute to industrialisation, such a
'development' is almost invariably distorted.
Realpolitik and Categorical Imperatives
The concepts used by practising politicians necessarily
fit within the intellectual framework of the status quo.
The rules of the international political game - even
when they concern 'neutral' international agencies -
confine official discourse to desires and categorical
imperatives. Thus, when speaking of disarmament
and the risks of war, they use phrases like 'states have
to understand' or 'confidence has to be strengthened',
etc.
Johan Galtung and other critics of the Palme Report
have warned us that the Report cannot by itself
mobilise opinion against the arms race and the nuclear
threat [Galtung 19831. The Palme Commission did not
sufficiently explore the roots of and remedies for
power struggles, growing official violence and
international anarchy. The confidence it places in
negotiations and treaties seems almost boundless,
even when (as is mostly the case) they do not bring any
tangible results.
Herbert Marcuse has called attention to the apologetic
character of the 'applied sciences', which is based on
nothing but the realism of 'this is the situation'
[Marcuse 1964]. The philosophy of the Palme
Commission follows a similar logic: 'Nobody is fond
of war, we also denounce it. But there have always
been wars. Money should be spent on other purposes,
but until this is more generally recognised, we should
concentrate on more limited arms control measures
and strengthen the existing mechanisms of the United
Nations'.
What is in question is not the intentions of the authors
of the Report - who share an evident personal
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personal concern for peace - but their role as active
statesmen. As such, they are or have been part of the
global political system which has produced the arms
race, deterrence and the militarisation of the South.
Their status quo-supporting behaviour is also
reflected in the fact that the authors of the Report
neither express support for the European peace
movements, nor hint that there might be common
ground with other antisystemic movements such as the
feminists, or the Greens. Nor do they show much
interest in grassroots or liberation movements in the
Third World.
In the recent past, the East-West balance, arms control
and the multilateral approach to disarmament, have
functioned as ideologies, legitimising the bipolar
worldview and the security concept which sustains it.
The Palme Report has not succeeded in transcending
this rhetoric, so it can neither be translated into
concrete political programmes nor be made a starting
point for demilitarisation. Common security remains
no more than an idea under the present circumstances
of insecurity and mutual escalation in the arms race.
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